An instrument used by companies to hedge against the risk of weather-related losses. The investor who sells a weather derivative agrees to bear this risk for a premium. If nothing happens, the investor makes a profit. However, if the weather turns bad, then the company who buys the derivative claims the agreed amount. This is not the same as insurance, which is for low-probability events like hurricanes and tornados. In contrast, derivatives cover high-probability events like a dryer-than-expected summer.
A situation in which one participant's gains result only from another participant's equivalent losses. The net change in total wealth among participants is zero; the wealth is just shifted from one to another. Options and future contracts are examples of zero-sum games (excluding costs). For every person who gains on a contract, there is a counter-party who loses. Gambling is also an example of a zero-sum game. A stock market, however, is not a zero-sum game because wealth can be created in a stock market.
An exchange of income streams in which the stream of floating interest-rate payments is made periodically, as it would be in a plain vanilla swap, but the stream of fixed-rate payments is made as one lump-sum payment when the swap reaches maturity instead of periodically over the life of the swap. The amount of the fixed-rate payment is based on the swap's zero coupon rate. Variations of the zero coupon swap exist to meet different investment needs. A reverse zero-coupon swap pays the lump-sum payment when the contract is initiated, reducing credit risk for the pay-floating party. An exchangeable zero-coupon swap can use an embedded option to turn the lump-sum payment into a series of payments. It is also possible for the floating-rate payments to be paid as a lump sum in a zero-coupon swap.
A trading or business decision that does not entail any expense upon execution. Zero-cost trading strategies can be used with a variety of investment types, including equities, commodities and options. A zero-cost business strategy might be to improve sales prospects for a home by decluttering all the rooms, packing excess belongings into boxes and moving the boxes to the garage. Zero cost strategies often involve the simultaneous purchase and sale of an asset such as that both costs cancel each other out. One example of a zero-cost trading strategy is the zero-cost cylinder. In this options trading strategy, the investor works with two out-of-the money options, either buying a call and selling a put or buying a put and selling a call. The strike price is chosen so that the premiums from the purchase and sale effectively cancel each other out. Zero-cost strategies help reduce risk by eliminating upfront costs.
A type of positive-carry collar that secures a return through the purchase of a cap and sale of a floor. Also called "zero cost options" or "equity risk reversals." This investment strategy is sometimes used in relation to interest rates, commodities, options, and equities. Investors looking to secure a return will sell a cap and buy a floor, whereas borrowers will sell a floor and buy a cap. For investors, the cost of the cap is offset by the income received from the floor. An example of a zero cost option collar is the purchase of a put option and the sale of a call option with a lower strike price. The sale of the call will cap the return if the underlying falls in price, but it will also offset the purchase of the put. Obviously, upside risk is still unlimited.
The expression "writing an option" refers to the act of selling an option. An option is the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell a particular trading instrument at a specified price, on or before its expiration. When someone writes (or "sells") an option, he or she must deliver to the buyer a specified number of shares if the option is excercised The writer has an obligation to perform a duty while the buyer has the option to take action. There are two general types of option writing: covered and naked. In a covered call, the option writer already owns the underlying trading instrument and wishes to make extra money from the position. He or she can write (or sell) an option based on the expectation that the underlying's price will move in a particular way. The buyer pays the writer a premium in exchange for writing the option. If the option trades at a value that benefits the buyer, the seller is obligated to hand over the shares. If the option expires at a value that does not benefit the buyer, the seller retains the original shares. If the option writer does not own the underlying instrument, it is said to be a "naked" option. This is more risky than writing a covered call since the writer is still obligated to produce the specified number of shares of the particular contract (without already owning them).
The seller of an option who collects the premium payment from the buyer. For example, a writer holds a short position on a call option. If the call option is exercised, then the writer has to sell the underlying stock at the strike price of the option. Conversely, if you are the writer of a put option, you are said to be long, and must purchase the underlying stock at the particular price. Being a writer is relatively risky - especially on a naked position. This technique should not be used by those who are new to option markets.
basel Committee on Banking Supervision The basel Committee has played a leading role in standardizing bank regulations across jurisdictions. Its origins can be traced to 1974. On June 26, 1974, German regulators forced the troubled Bank Herstatt into liquidation. That day, a number of banks had released payment of DEM to Herstatt in Frankfurt in exchange for USD that was to be delivered in New York. Because of time-zone differences, Herstatt ceased operations between the times of the respective payments. The counterparty banks did not receive their USD payments. Responding to the cross-jurisdictional implications of the Herstatt debacle, the G-10 countries (the G-10 is actually eleven countries: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States) and Luxembourg formed a standing committee under the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Called the basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the committee comprises representatives from central banks and regulatory authorities. Over time, the focus of the committee has evolved, embracing initiatives designed to: define roles of regulators in cross-jurisdictional situations; ensure that international banks or bank holding companies do not escape comprehensive supervision by a "home" regulatory authority; promote uniform capital requirements so banks from different countries may compete with one another on a "level playing field." The basel Committee's does not have legislative authority, but participant countries are implicitly bound to implement its recommendations. Usually, the committee has allowed for some flexibility in how local authorities implement recommendations, so national laws vary. In 1988, the basel Committee proposed a set of minimal capital requirements for banks. These became law in G-10 countries in 1992, with Japanese banks permitted an extended transition period. The requirements have come to be known as the 1988 basel Accord. To understand the scope of the 1988 accord, we need to clarify what we mean by "bank." Some jurisdictions distinguish between banks and securities firms, and the basel accord applied only to the former. Under its Glass-Steagall Act, the United States had long distinguished between commercial banks and securities firms (investment banks or broker-dealers). Following World War II, Japan adopted a similar legal distinction. The United Kingdom also distinguished between banks and securities firms, although this was more a matter of custom than law. By comparison, Germany and other European countries had a tradition of universal banking, which made no distinction between banks and securities firms. The 1988 basel Accord primarily addressed banking in the sense of deposit taking and lending (commercial banking under US law), so its focus was credit risk. Banks were subject to an 8% capital requirement. Specifically, they would calculate metrics for: capital, and credit risk. with a requirement that: capital A bank's capital was defined as comprising two tiers. Tier 1 ("core") capital included the book value of common stock, non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock and published reserves from post-tax retained earnings. Tier 2 ("supplementary") capital was deemed of lower quality. It included, subject to various conditions, general loan loss reserves, long-term subordinated debt and cumulative and/or redeemable preferred stock. A maximum of 50% of a bank's capital could comprise tier 2 capital. Credit risk was calculated as the sum of risk-weighted asset values. Generally, G-10 government debt was weighted 0%, G-10 bank debt was weighted 20%, and other debt, including corporate debt and the debt of non-G-10 governments, was weighted 100%. Additional rules applied to mortgages, local government debt in G-10 countries, and contingent obligations, such as letters of credit or derivatives. In the early 1990s, the basel Committee decided to update the 1988 accord to include bank capital requirements for market risk. This would have implications for non-bank securities firms. Any capital requirements the basel Committee adopted for banks' market risk would be incorporated into future updates of Europe's Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD) and thereby apply to Britain's non-bank securities firms. If the same framework were extended to non-bank securities firms outside Europe, then market risk capital requirements for banks and securities firms could be harmonized globally. In 1991, the basel Committee entered discussions with the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) to jointly develop such a framework. IOSCO is the primary international organization representing securities regulators. The two organizations formed a technical committee, and work commenced in January 1992. Because of the fundamental differences between banks and securities firms (see this glossary's article regulatory capital), the initiative soon ran into trouble. Europe's draft CAD regulations already applied uniform capital standards to banks and securities firms. They had to because Europe's universal banks were both banks and securities firms. Many European regulators wanted the basel-IOSCO initiative to adopt rules similar to the draft CAD. This would have required that the SEC abandon its own long-established Uniform Net Capital Rule (UNCR) for securities firms in favor of the weaker European rules. Richard Breeden was chairman of the SEC and chairman of the basel-IOSCO technical committee. Ultimately, he balked at discarding the SEC's rules. An analysis by the SEC indicated that the European approach might reduce capital requirements for US securities firms by 70% or more. Permitting such a reduction, simply to harmonize banking and securities regulations, seemed imprudent. The basel-IOSCO initiative had failed. In the United States, banking and securities capital requirements were to remain distinct. In April 1993, following the failure of the basel-IOSCO initiative, the basel Committee released a package of proposed amendments to the 1988 accord. Primarily, these proposed minimum capital requirements for banks' market risk. The proposal generally conformed to Europe's CAD. Banks would be required to identify a trading book and hold capital for trading book market risks and organization-wide foreign exchange exposures. Capital charges for the trading book would be based upon a crude value-at-risk (VaR) measure loosely consistent with a 10-day 95% VaR metric. Similar to a "building block" VaR measure used by Europe's CAD, this partially recognized hedging effects but ignored diversification effects. In addition to capital for credit risk, banks would now be required to hold capital equal to the calculated VaR. If we define market risk as VaR/8%, the proposed amendment required that banks hold capital such that: basel The proposal also liberalized the definition of capital by adding a third tier. Tier 3 capital comprised short-term subordinated debt, but it could only be used to cover market risk. The committee received numerous comments on this proposal. Commentators perceived the crude VaR measure as a step backwards. Many banks were already using proprietary VaR measures. Most of these modeled diversification effects, and some recognized portfolio non-linearities. Commentators wondered if, by embracing a crude VaR measure, regulators might stifle innovation in risk measurement technology. In April 1995, the basel Committee released a revised proposal. This made a number of changes, including the extension of market risk capital requirements to cover organization-wide commodities exposures. An important provision allowed banks to use either a regulatory building-block VaR measure or their own proprietary VaR measure for computing capital requirements. Use of a proprietary measure required approval of regulators. A bank would have to have an independent risk management function and satisfy regulators that it was following acceptable risk management practices. Regulators would also need to be satisfied that the proprietary VaR measure was sound. Proprietary measures would need to support a 10-day 99% VaR metric and be able to address the non-linear exposures of options. Diversification effects could be recognized within broad asset categories—fixed income, equity, foreign exchange and commodities—but not across asset categories. Market risk capital requirements were set equal to the greater of: the previous day's VaR, or the average VaR over the previous sixty business days, multiplied by a factor of at least 3. The original VaR measure—which was now called the "standardized" measure—was changed modestly from the 1993 proposal. It may reasonably be interpreted as still reflecting a 10-day 95% VaR metric. Extra capital charges were added in an attempt to recognize non-linear exposures. The basel Committee's new proposal was adopted in 1996 as an amendment to the 1988 accord. It is known as the 1996 amendment. It went into effect in 1998. By this time, shortcomings with the original accord's treatment of credit risk were becoming evident. The simple system of risk weightings provided an incentive for banks to hold the 0% risk-weighted debt of G-10 governments (a fact viewed with some cynicism, since those same governments were largely responsible for the original accord). However, such debt tended to be unprofitable. Far more profitable for banks was corporate debt, which was weighted 100%. With all corporate debt being weighted equally, it made sense for banks to hold the most risky corporate debt. Higher quality corporate debt incurred exactly the same capital charges but was less profitable. During this period, markets for credit derivatives and securitizations grew explosively. It was an open secret that banks were employing these to take advantage of shortcomings in the 1988 Accord's crude system of risk weights. This practice is called regulatory arbitrage. Another issue during this period was operational risk. Operational risk poses significant risk for banks. It includes a variety of contingencies including fraud—and fraud is routinely a factor in bank failures. Neither the original basel Accord nor the 1996 Amendment required capital for operational risk. In January 1999, the basel Committee proposed a new capital accord, which has come to be known as basel II. There followed an extensive consultative period, with the committee releasing additional proposals for consultation in January 2001 and April 2003. It also conducting three quantitative impact studies to assess those proposals. The finalized basel II Accord was released in June 2004. basel II is based on three pillars: minimum capital requirements, supervisory review, and market discipline. Generally, basel II retains the definition of bank capital and the market risk provisions of the 1996 Amendment. It largely replaces the old treatment of credit risk, and it requires capital for operational risk. With some juggling, the basic capital requirement for banks can be expressed as: basel As with market risk under the 1996 Amendment, banks have options as to how they value their credit risk and market risk. For credit risk, they can choose from among: a Standardized Approach, a Foundation Internal Rating-based (IRB) Approach, and an Advanced IRB Approach. For operational risk, their choices are: a Basic Indicator Approach a Standardized Approach, and an Internal Measurement Approach. basel II had an effective date of December 2006. It was not as widely implemented as the earlier Accord. basel II largely achieved European regulators' objectives of addressing shortcomings in the original accord's treatment of credit risk, incorporating operational risk and harmonizing capital requirements for banks and securities firms. Europe has applied basel II to all its banks with CAD III. US regulators are less enthusiastic. While they share the goal of addressing shortcomings in the original accord's treatment of credit risk, they feel that existing bank supervision in the United States already addresses operational risk. Also, harmonization has never been a priority for US regulators. They perceive basel II as primarily relevant for internationally active banks. They applied it to just ten of the largest US banks. Another ten have the option to opt-in. Other US banks remain subject to existing US regulations, including those adopted under the original basel Accord. It remains unclear to what extent other countries will implement basel II.
登录
工商服务
危机公关
金融律师
app开发
财税服务
金融牌照
网站建设
知识产权
企业征信
审计评估